This paper suggests a new approach towards online service provider liability which relies on duty of care. It proposes a concrete compliance framework for online platforms, borrowed from risk regulation, and modelled on anti-money laundering (AML) obligations in the financial sector. First, the prohibition on obliging platforms to monitor content in a general manner under the E-Commerce Directive will be discussed. On the face of it this may clash with a standardized requirement to filter for infringing content. Subsequently, the regulatory choice for such a duty of care standard will be explored. It is argued that the largely self-regulatory proposals currently on the table may be ill fitted to achieve traction and accountability. Finally, a three-tier compliance framework, modelled on the AML system and using a riskbased approach, is proposed. The pitfalls of such a highly automated compliance solution, which enforces complex legal norms, will also be touched on.
Introduction
For over 20 years the internet has been revolutionising the way we do business, create and exchange information. Information service providers (ISPs) who enable access to information on the internet and information uploaded by users and businesses have occupied a centre stage of the so-called platform economy. We know these hosts as social networks, user generated content platforms, search engines or online marketplaces, to name but a few . According to this, ISPs enjoy these exemptions if they are passive in the sense that they play a mere technical and automated role with regards to the content on their platforms. The idea is that this kind of hands-off involvement does not confer any control or knowledge over the information, including its potential illegality, shared by these information hosts. Consequently, they cannot be held liable for any damages caused by hosting this content. They would just need to act expeditiously to remove illegal content when notified of its existence. In addition, they may be asked to prevent the notified content reappearing on its platform. Article 15 ECD, on the other hand, ensures that ISPs cannot be asked to monitor platform traffic at a general level in order to prevent infringements. Article 15 ECD has been advanced by the CJEU but also national courts when limiting the obligations of ISPs for preventing or policing specific infringements, which are possible under Article 14 ECD
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.
So when arguing about whether intermediaries may be asked to be more proactive in preventing the occurrence of infringing content on their platforms, one inevitably needs to discuss Article 15 ECD. This Article is generally seen as an argument against widening infringement prevention obligations 11 . As this paper will propose a solution which explores more proactive infringement prevention obligations, it could be seen as in conflict with the current prohibition to require general monitoring. This paper submits that a critical re-evaluation of Article 15 ECD is needed: 1) the 8 ECD Art 2(a) refers to this definition of an ISP as laid down in Directive 98/34, Art 2 (1). This directive was replaced by Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services 2015 para 1 (1). The relevant Article is now 1 (1). The majority of today's online platforms would meet these criteria. The recent judgement by the CJEU on Uber (Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL, C-434/15 [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:981 (CJEU).provides a useful delineation in this respect. 9 ibid. Articles 12 and 13 apply to internet access providers, so called "mere conduits", and to caching, respectively. . In summary, the justifications for Article 15 seem to rest mainly on a desire to protect a nascent ISP sector from overly high burdens of manual verification. It ensures the availability The above examples show that there is an emerging opinion on how to involve ISPs more proactively in preventing and combatting third-party infringing content. At the same time there seems to be less consensus over the type of regulatory intervention needed. Beyond the above ideas there have been no concrete proposals on the compliance framework and risk management framework which could be used to implement such new duty of care standards.
Looking at the regulatory choice, it appears that at least the EU Commission has set its mind on a mix of self-and co-regulation, relying heavily on industry-driven codes of conduct and information sharing. In its recent proposals for a Copyright Directive 43 the EU Commission mandates the use of filtering technologies. It prescribes cooperation and information sharing between platforms and rights holders, and encourages best practice sharing between both parties.
In the area of hate speech and terrorist content regulatory efforts rest on a (non-binding) code of conduct between major social media platform operators
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. The same is true for the fight against counterfeit products on the internet where the Commission merely facilitates stakeholder action based on a broad Memorandum of Understanding between major brand owners and e-commerce platforms
45
. In the amended AVMSD 46 the Commission is arguably closest to a co-regulatory mechanism. While it obliges video sharing platforms to take appropriate measures to protect users against illegal content, it also charges the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) with facilitating and advising during the creation of EU wide codes of conduct and best practice sharing.
According to these proposals the actual influence over extent and nature of the infringement prevention and detection remains largely in the hands of platforms and industry stakeholders (such 
Self-or co-regulation?
There are several reasons for the current prevalence of self-regulatory models on the internet. The most common, distilled from the variety of literature available on this topic appear to be: 1) the capability challenge faced by regulatory and enforcement authorities: the sheer amount of content, the unprecedented level of technical skills needed to understand internet businesses, plus the speed with which the industry develops 54 lead to the state assigning more regulation tasks to the private sector; 2) the new cross-cutting nature of the internet and the emerging multi-sided platform economy requires new interdisciplinary and innovative, regulatory tools which can be a problem with regulators whose scope of activity is firmly prescribed
55
, 3) a cultural tradition in certain
European countries 56 or varieties of capitalism 57 which is conducive to the emergence of self-and co-regulatory structures, especially in new and emerging industry sectors.
At the same time, the risks of self-regulatory models for the internet are increasingly discussed
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With regards to content regulation a major criticism refers to a loss of democratic control and accountability over enforcement if the private sector is left to its own devices to regulate. As powerful internet actors define and enforce their content policies largely based on commercial interest criteria and continue to enjoy far reaching immunities their activities risk being above the law
59
. Nevertheless, these companies need to and will react to local regulators and cultural sensibilities regarding for example offensive material. However, with the current protection they may be able to choose and pick, and alternatively claim ignorance over the existence of the content, Senden and others (n 47) . This study identifies the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and to some extent Italy with strong traditions in co-and self-regulatory practices. 57 Marsden (n 7) 67-70. Marsden cites Rhinish and Scandinavian capitalism as conducive to co-and self-regulation, and outlines marked differences to US regulatory styles. 58 Co-regulation, depending on definition and the degree of involvement of state actors, is more ambivalently discussed than self-regulation. In fact co-regulation is both seen as suitable remedy to self-regulation (Spindler and Thorun (n 47 . The debate over a review of the intermediary liability regime is directly related to this. As discussed in the previous section, the thrust of the debate should be to forego or relax the distinction between specific and general monitoring, and "passive" and "active" hosts and concentrate on reasonable duties of care. It is clear immediately that the debate on duty of care really is about prescribing or bringing to light activities that online platforms need to perform as diligent economic operators. The call for duties of care, whatever their design, goes hand in hand in with demands for publicly controlled governance and transparency common to other economic areas faced with similar transformation caused by new technological disruption and information management. Examples are the financial industry, environmental management, or technical and safety requirements concerning products.
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Where the state tries to gain more regulatory control it needs to counter the pressures which have previously forced the prevalence of self-regulatory models mentioned above. . The latter concepts acknowledge that in these information and technology driven industries, which require complex decision making, legal compliance also entails complex decisions. Traditional rules-based compliance is too static and ill fitted to achieve desired policy outcomes.
Decisional accountability means then that regulatory risk management is being embedded in the technology and the algorithm itself
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. This approach is not always and necessarily geared towards achieving 100% legal compliance. Instead it forces the regulated entity to demonstrate that its technology choices were sufficiently informed by regulatory requirements. The emphasis is on good, responsible and transparent decision making. It enables the regulator to have constant oversight and intervene as necessary
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. This means however, that regulators also need to become more technical and at least be able to audit and assess algorithms and complex control software.
Meanwhile there is a need to continue to involve sound human judgement at critical points of the algorithmic decision making to counter the institutionalization of risk measurement
71
. This kind of regulatory governance system could be used for reasonable duty of care standards around content regulation. In fact, and as detailed above, platforms are making these kinds of decisions already and enforce the law, albeit largely unfettered from regulatory oversight. This Section analyses the regulatory framework of anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML) in the financial industry with a view for its suitability as a model for a duty of care standard in platform content regulation. Before undertaking a short explanation of the AML legislation and its implementation, the reasons for the choice of this regulatory framework will be outlined briefly. After this, the elements of the AML structure which could be adopted to duty of care obligations will be explained.
It is important to state that this comparison is not meant to liken the crime of money-laundering or terrorist financing to unlicensed video uploads, hate speech, the online sale of fake mobile phone chargers or the like. It simply analyses the technical and conceptual suitability of the AML management framework in view of its similarities in the transaction environment and the use of technology with the area of platform content management.
There are several reasons why the AML framework lends itself to the purposes of this exercise: 2) Financial products are highly complex and innovation both in financial service products and means of value transfer are strong. In addition, the circumvention techniques by fraudsters are constantly evolving. Online platforms face similar challenges, caused by complexities in content legislation (e.g. the correct and timely identification of copyright, trademark infringements or hate speech, product legislation in e-commerce) and constantly evolving business models and technologies.
3) AML happens in an international framework applied throughout the industrialised world, reflecting the globalised nature of the financial industry and capital flows 
The AML framework -a brief overview
By the late 1980s industrialised states had realised that money laundering had become a problem on a global scale which could not be tackled through domestic legislation alone. This was mainly due the accelerating globalisation of capital flows, trade and the digital revolution, which facilitated global information exchange. base and geographic exposure. It was deemed more effective to allocate the risk management to the companies as they were dealing directly with the customer and had immediate access over all relevant transaction data. This has also led to the regulated institutions developing highly sophisticated risk transaction monitoring software systems
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. Under the risk-based approach they are now moving increasingly away from entirely rules-based (red flag) transaction monitoring algorithms and supplement these with flexible, risk-based approaches and intelligent, self-learning algorithms to detect fraud patterns
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Meanwhile the prevalence of algorithmic decision making in the AML area has also been criticised over lack of (democratic) accountability and procedural transparency as it is enshrined within a hardly penetrable complex technical system
93
. Nevertheless, while a majority of suspicious transaction reports is software generated, they still require human follow up, investigation and explanation with the regulator. It has been argued that this would be a way to balance against defensive and overzealous reporting, as well as address concerns over opacity of the process
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Sustained regulator involvement and independent human enquiry into machine decisions could eventually help avoiding self-referential and unaccountable systems, and ensure transparency of the algorithm
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Structuring duty of care obligations
As previously mentioned there are three core elements that can be distinguished in an AML framework: KYC, transaction monitoring (both part of CDD), and suspicious transaction reporting. This paper suggests that, on a modified basis, these could be core components of a horizontally applied duty of care standard for online platforms. The scope of each of these components could then be adapted on a sectorial level, i.e. to the type of content or type of platform business model. A risk-based approach, making platforms responsible and accountable for their risk assessment while setting the broad parameters of such an exercise, should be another key element of an effective duty of care system which platforms can apply from AML. Where 91 Gadinis and Mangels (n 77) 809, 882-883. 92 Gao and others (n 72) 67-69. 93 Bergström, Svedberg Helgesson and Mörth (n 77). Bamberger (n 68) 727-730. 94 Gadinis and Mangels (n 77) 886-888. 95 Bamberger (n 68).
platforms demonstrate compliance with the defined duty of care standard they would be exempt from any content liability. In effect, the duty of care standard would replace the current liability regime of the ECD and eschew the current division between "active" and "passive" hosts as well as the dichotomy of specific and general monitoring.
Standards in this context mean technical standards, which in a co-regulatory approach, would serve as a legally mandated proof of compliance, similar to the "New Approach" used by the EU legislator in the area of product conformity
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. Product standards rely on a similar conceptual approach, which is based on self-certification but may also, depending on the complexity and risk inherent in the product, prescribe compliance with specific technical and safety requirements defined through European norms. As alluded to above, this flexibility could be applied on a sectoral level when adapting duty of care standards to specific technical platform models and/or types of content.
It should be noted that the risk-based approach is also applied in other regulatory contexts within the EU. The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is based on such an approach
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. It mandates risk assessments of the data processing activities of controllers and processors, and prescribes data protection impact assessment and reporting requirements for high risk activities involving personal data
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. This fits into the wider picture of modern risk regulation 99 being applied in areas driven by complex technologies and innovation
100
KYC
Within the AML framework the KYC process is performed to identify the customer and enable the application of the risk based approach
101
. Identification checks, beneficiary owner and business purpose verification would allow the entity to decide whether enhanced, standard or simplified due diligence measure would need to be applied to the customer. The idea of KYC-style customer identification processes for intermediaries or online platforms is not new. In the response to the EU Commission's public consultation on the enforcement environment of intellectual property rights (IPRs), rights owners demanded that such processes be prescribed for intermediaries
102
. Rights owners would like to see such processes on online platforms so that repeat defenders can be adequately sanctioned. For rights owners themselves this would facilitate prosecuting sellers or uploaders for rights infringements. The CJEU has provided a basis for such obligations, for example, in L'Oréal, where it required eBay to prevent infringements of the same kind by the same seller
103
. Protection against repeat offenders requires the possession of the identity of the offending party. In McFadden the CJEU concluded that password protection of a public W-LAN network, which required the internet user to disclose their identity, would be an adequate measure of dissuasion from connections which infringed copyright or related rights
104
In the e-commerce sector platforms may already be required to apply KYC if they are offering their own payments solutions for sellers and clients.
The KYC requirement for online platforms would serve two objectives: 1) identify customers or uploaders with a view to be able to enforce against repeat infringers and, depending on the type of platform content, evaluate the infringement risk exposure for the platform.
2) as a deterrence against users to infringe rights.
KYC processes should be flexibly defined according to the type of platform, or content that is being hosted or uploaded. For example, customer identification requirements could be more comprehensive in the area of e-commerce were a contractual relationship is established between the platform and the seller, or where there is deeper integration into the platform, such as use payment or delivery services, or detailed product data upload. By contrast, for user comments on a news portals, user identification criteria could be less onerous taking account of freedom of expression rights. This was confirmed in the Delfi judgement where the Court acknowledged the importance of user anonymity for posting comments on internet news portal. At the same time, it acknowledged that different levels of anonymity may be available and appropriate and that they must be balanced against other rights. Those different levels could for example, consist of a registration which is only visible to the ISP but ensures complete anonymity vis-a vis other users
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In any case, sectoral KYC obligations should be determined following a thorough balancing exercise with fundamental rights.
Risk-based content monitoring
The AML framework prescribes ongoing monitoring of both transactions and the business relationship. The ultimate aim is to spot changes in the risk profile of a customer and to prevent and detect money laundering or terrorist financing activities.
For online platforms, there would be two important ongoing monitoring stages:
1) transaction monitoring during product/content upload;
2) ongoing platform surveillance for infringing activity on the platform
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Platforms could be required to establish rules-based systems for high-risk activities and content, e.g. media files highly susceptible to copyright infringement, content highly likely to consist of hate speech or highly regulated product sectors on ecommerce platforms. The ECD already requires that an ISPs must not have "actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, …, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent" 107 for it to benefit from the liability exception. In L'Oréal, this awareness was related to being a diligent economic operator
108
. Similarly, German courts have asked peer-to-peer and video sharing platforms to check content on their site pre-emptively depending on the availability of effective filter technology and depending on the susceptibility of their business model to infringing uses
109
105 See for example in : Delfi AS v Estonia, no 65469/09 (ECtHR (Grand Chamber) . This is similar to demands made by Citron et al in the US, who argue that platforms' "good faith" efforts to proactively identify and restrict abusive content should automatically confer liability onto them under the Communications Decency Act
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A duty of care standard in content monitoring could ask platforms to demonstrate that they have performed a risk assessment of possible infringing uses of their platform and assessed and classified the legal risk related to their content. They would then need to demonstrate that they have adapted the use of prevention and filtering measures using a risk-based approach.
A methodology for such a risk-based filtering could see a risk classification of the types of speech or user-generated-content most susceptible to being unlawful. , and draw their data from areas across the company (financial/revenue, customer, product, supply chain data)
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. Mandating a risk-based approach to prevention through transaction monitoring, and setting broad framework conditions for its application could be a way of dragging existing filter algorithms into the light. If platforms were required to explain the risk assessment, the ensuing choice and scope of prevention and filtering technology as well as the operational procedures to regulators, this could create the kind of transparency which is currently needed
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. That transparency is in danger of being eroded, however, by pushing for self-regulated, industry owned infringement prevention solutions
123
But even in a co-regulated, technical risk management system there remain accountability and abuse challenges. These complex filtering algorithms will execute on a multitude of embedded However, the ability to enforce effectively against infringers remains essential for a wellfunctioning duty of care standard. This third component of a duty of care regime could therefore be used to define and standardise ex post measures that platforms would need to comply with.
There could be three distinct elements: 1) Automated takedown conditions: content filtering systems will be designed to take down infringing content automatically. In fact, these systems exist already and they are deployed by a . By contrast, the recent Commission communication on tackling illegal content on the internet, which encourages standardized notice and takedown transparency reporting 138 is a useful step in the right direction.
Limitations and risks
There are also limitations to the proposed duty of care standard which should be mentioned. For one, standardization is initially a time-consuming process and technology and market developments may over-run it. However, once in place the advantage of the solution proposed here is that it is adaptable. Secondly, co-regulatory solutions could also lead to a lack of procedural legitimacy if highly technical industry and regulator groups work in exclusive circles whereby the former set the tone and direction of the standard setting process due to their intimate technical knowledge
139
. A possibly remedy proposed in this article would consist of mandatory, regular reporting and external audits in order to make the standard developments process transparent and accountable. Lastly, there also competition concerns if the standard setting is dominated by leading platforms, hindering new market entrants to prosper.
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. 
Conclusion
This paper demonstrated that there is an emerging opinion that new, normative duties of care, could be a way forward to involving platforms consistently in efforts to prevent and remove infringing content online. These duties of care should be adaptable to the type of content or platform design. While the borders between protectable "passive" and liable "active" intermediaries are disappearing in practice, Article 15 ECD could be seen as a formidable obstacle to formulating more proactive infringement prevention rules. However, this paper also tried to demonstrate that the justifications for Article 15, which dates back to the early days of the internet economy, were motivated by a desire to protect a nascent industry. These economic justifications may be outdated today as the platform economy has come of age. Moreover, courts can perform effective balancing exercises between rights protection of online content and fundamental rights of users/uploaders without the use of Article 15. Meanwhile, the term "general monitoring" is too unspecific to be applied in a meaningful way to today's platform risk management systems.
Notwithstanding this, there are various proposals both from academia and the EU to create duty of care style infringement prevention obligations. Most of these relate to specific content sectors or platform designs. They are a mixed bag of self and co-regulatory measures, and not all proposals appear to consciously select a certain type of governance model. The EU Commission has currently opted for self-regulatory solutions. Whether this is the best choice is questionable. While there is a natural drift for self-regulatory solutions in highly technical, fast moving and innovative sectors, they have major drawbacks, such as democratic legitimacy and automation bias influenced by commercial interest scope creep and self-referentiality. This paper suggests that a co-regulatory model, by which industry and regulators are mandated to create risk management standards, is a better way forward. The current AML framework is presented as a possible model for designing such a duty of care standard. There are notable similarities in the financial transaction and online content management sectors which lend themselves to this analogy. The duty of care standard for preventing infringing content could be structured along the current AML framework. It would impose three elements: KYC, content monitoring, and enforcement and reporting obligations. The standard would follow a risk-based approach, asking platforms to engage in transparent and auditable risk assessments of their business model and content following a mandated risk management framework. These frameworks could be adapted to different sectors, depending on type of content or platform design. Depending on the risk classification, platforms would then need to implement processes which effectively address the risks. Platforms would be given freer choice regarding the operational and technological means with which they address these risks.
Finally, harmonised NTD procedures could be part of the enforcement component of such a standard. Transparency and democratic accountability of such a standard would be safeguarded by regulator involvement in the standard setting process, and regular compliance reporting and external audit requirements.
